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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant James Eugene Rought sold fentanyl to Dana 
Carichner, who provided some to Cara Giberson.  Both 
overdosed.  Giberson was revived with Narcan; Carichner 
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died.  Rought was indicted for possession of fentanyl with 
intent to distribute resulting in death and serious bodily injury.  
A few days later, he was interrogated by the FBI.  After being 
advised of his rights verbally and in writing, he answered 
questions about his drug use and his supplier, but said he did 
not want to talk about Carichner’s death without a lawyer.  The 
interrogating agents respected his wishes and turned the 
questioning to other subjects.  In discussing those other 
subjects, however, Rought quickly brought the conversation 
back around to Carichner — and then made incriminating 
statements.  Rought moved to suppress the statements he made 
to the FBI after he invoked his right to counsel.  The District 
Court denied the motion, the statements were used against 
Rought at trial, and a jury convicted him.  Rought now appeals, 
arguing that the court erred in denying his suppression motion 
and that he should receive a new trial in which the 
incriminating statements would not be admissible. 
 
We will affirm.  In Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 
(1987), the Supreme Court held that invocations of the right to 
counsel during custodial interrogations can be “limited.”  Id. at 
529-30.  After a limited invocation, interrogation can continue 
on topics not covered by the invocation.  If the suspect, without 
prompting from law enforcement, then voluntarily reinitiates 
discussion of a covered topic and waives her previously 
invoked rights, it “is quite consistent with the Fifth 
Amendment” for the suspect’s statements about a covered 
topic to be admissible at trial.  Id. at 529.  Because that is what 
happened in this case, the District Court correctly denied 
Rought’s suppression motion, and he is not entitled to a new 
trial.  
    
I. 
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Rought sold fentanyl to Carichner on August 13, 2018.  
Giberson was there and witnessed the transaction.  On August 
15, Giberson asked Carichner to get her some fentanyl from his 
source.  Rought again sold fentanyl to Carichner on August 16, 
and the two of them used drugs together.  That evening, 
Carichner delivered some of the fentanyl he acquired from 
Rought to Giberson at the Blogg, the restaurant where she 
worked, leaving it for her in her car.  Carichner went home.  
After midnight, Giberson overdosed on fentanyl in the 
bathroom of the Blogg, but was revived with Narcan.  
Carichner died of a fentanyl overdose at home and in bed 
sometime after 2:00 a.m. 
 
Law enforcement connected the overdoses to Rought.  
He was charged on October 16, 2018, in a one count indictment 
with distributing and possessing fentanyl with intent to 
distribute resulting in serious bodily injury and death.  Three 
days later, Rought was interrogated for approximately one hour 
by Special Agent Larry Whitehead and Task Force Officer 
Shane Yelland of the FBI.  The interrogation, which was 
videotaped and is the focus of this appeal, took place in an FBI 
interview room at the Scranton federal courthouse immediately 
prior to Rought’s initial appearance on the federal charge.  
Rought was already in custody for state parole violations at the 
time of the interrogation.   
 
At the outset, Whitehead confirmed that Rought had 
been arrested in the past and informed him of his Miranda 
rights.  Whitehead also provided Rought with a written consent 
form describing his rights and gave Rought an opportunity to 
read it.  Asked if he was willing to talk, Rought responded that 
he was, “to a point.”  Whitehead emphasized that Rought could 
“stop at any time,” and that “those are the ground rules.”  
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Rought then signed the consent form, which among other 
things provided that Rought was willing to answer questions 
without a lawyer present. 
 
For the next twenty-four minutes, Rought answered 
questions about his drug use, his drug supplier, his criminal 
history, and his relationship with Carichner, among other 
topics.  Rought insisted that he was not a drug dealer.  He 
believed that “the situation at hand is completely blown out of 
proportion” and noted that he and Carichner worked together 
and “got high together every day.”  He insisted again that he 
did not sell drugs to Carichner.  Rought explained that 
Carichner was his “best friend” and that they had grown up 
together.  Whitehead told Rought the interview was about 
understanding “both sides” of what happened, because law 
enforcement only had one side of the story so far.  Rought 
responded that “really you don’t know any side” because 
Giberson (who claimed to have seen Rought sell drugs to 
Carichner and whose name was “on the paperwork”) “wasn’t 
even there” and Rought “couldn’t even tell you what this chick 
looked like.”  Whitehead commented that “a tragedy resulted 
from your actions . . . and not just yours. . . . this is what’s 
going on daily in the community.” 
 
Whitehead told Rought that the federal criminal justice 
system can be “unforgiving” for violent crimes, but that it 
“rewards cooperation,” and that the FBI was interested in 
Rought’s suppliers.  Rought explained that his primary supplier 
went by “L.B.” and that Rought would buy from him in 
Wilkes-Barre.  If L.B. was unavailable, Rought would connect 
with other “random” suppliers in the area in order to meet the 
needs of his addiction — three or four bundles of fentanyl per 
day at that point.  Rought explained that he would buy a brick 
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of fentanyl from L.B. in order to get bulk pricing, and then 
“split it” with the people he got high with, including Carichner.  
Because he worked with Carichner “every day . . . most days 
we would split it.”  Rought also said that the quality of the 
drugs was “really good since somebody died.”  Whitehead 
asked Rought “why fentanyl?”  Rought explained that it was 
“what we wanted” because, at that time, state parole drug tests 
did not test for fentanyl.  Rought told Whitehead that L.B. was 
always on the lookout for guns, and would trade drugs for guns.  
One person who traded guns to L.B. was Stan Derby, a friend 
of Rought’s that died of an overdose, “probably” from drugs 
he acquired from L.B. 
 
Rought and Whitehead discussed how Wilkes-Barre 
was a “cesspool” of drug dealing and how society is “plagued” 
by drugs and addiction.  Whitehead emphasized his 
understanding that addiction is a difficult lifestyle to escape 
and brought up drug rehabilitation programs with Rought.  
Rought said he was once able to stop using drugs for a week 
after coming home from a five-day detox program, but began 
using them again because many of the people around him were 
using drugs, including Carichner. 
 
About twenty-four minutes into the interrogation, after 
Rought mentioned Carichner’s drug use, Whitehead asked, “So 
let’s talk about Dana [Carichner].  What happened there?”  
Rought replied, “I mean, I don’t really want to talk about that 
aspect without my lawyer. . . .  That’s a serious situation.  I 
mean, they’re trying to roof me.”1  Whitehead immediately 
responded that he understood and that “those are the ground 
 
1  There is no dispute that, as used here, to “roof” 
someone means to put that person in prison for a long time.  
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rules. . . .  That’s your right, and I respect that.” 
 
Whitehead then turned the conversation back to L.B. 
and reiterated that he was interested in the people “above” 
Rought.  He explained that people “caught in a bad spot,” like 
Rought, could help themselves and also help law enforcement 
“clean up the community.”  Whitehead then referenced 
Rought’s previous comment that his friend Stan Derby had 
overdosed.  That prompted Rought to acknowledge the toll that 
drug addiction had taken on those around him, including the 
lives of several friends and acquaintances who died of 
overdoses; Rought said “you’re not losing the effect on me.”  
Whitehead responded that he understood that toll and reiterated 
that he wanted Rought to share information that would help 
law enforcement in “going up the ladder” after L.B. and 
“whoever else there is.” 
 
In response, and just a few minutes after invoking his 
right to counsel, Rought stated that he did not like addiction 
any more than Whitehead and that drug dealers are “killing my 
friends just as much as, right now, you’re trying to say that I 
killed my friend [Carichner].”  Whitehead responded that he 
was not saying that Rought killed Carichner but that Rought 
“had a role and that’s unfortunate, it is.”  He noted that Rought 
must “feel like shit” about Carichner’s death, to which Rought 
responded, “Absolutely.”  Whitehead informed Rought that he 
did not believe Rought had “intent or malice” and that 
Carichner’s death was an “unfortunate tragedy.”  Rought then 
expressed anger about how he was being treated like a drug 
dealer when he did not sell drugs.  He asked “[j]ust because 
somebody that I worked with also got high and we got high 
together . . . how is that a crime? . . . [H]ow am I being charged 
with serious bodily injury [and] death?”  Rought expressed 
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incredulity that “the same dope that he snorted a bag of and 
died, I shot ten bags of right next to him.”  He also explained 
that he initially did not believe that Carichner had overdosed 
because it did not make sense that Carichner “got high, drove 
all the way home, 25-30 minutes, and then got into bed, and 
then died.” 
 
Whitehead commented that “we have to work through 
this . . . . The three of us, the prosecutor, and your attorney. . . 
. This is set in motion.”  He acknowledged that Rought was in 
a “shitty situation.”  Rought said he recognized that fact as soon 
as he learned “that I got . . . a fed case on Facebook.”  Yelland 
then steered the conversation back to L.B. by asking if L.B. 
used Facebook.  The remainder of the interrogation focused on 
L.B.  At one point, Whitehead offered to question Rought 
about L.B. with a lawyer present.  Rought did not express 
interest in this suggestion, and continued answering questions 
about L.B. until he was brought before the District Court for 
his initial appearance. 
 
In May 2019, Rought moved to suppress his post-
invocation statements on the ground that they were obtained in 
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  The 
Government filed a superseding indictment against Rought the 
following month; it added one count of conspiracy to possess 
fentanyl with intent to distribute and one count of aiding and 
abetting the distribution of fentanyl.  Rought pleaded not guilty 
to all three counts.  The District Court denied Rought’s 
suppression motion, concluding that Rought’s invocation of 
the right to counsel was limited to the circumstances of 
Carichner’s death, that law enforcement “should [not] have 
reasonably anticipated” that discussing L.B. and Derby’s 
overdose would prompt Rought to “renew discussions about” 
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Carichner, and that Rought knowingly and voluntarily waived 
his right not to speak about Carichner without a lawyer present.  
Appendix (“App.”) 97-99. 
 
At trial, the Government made frequent use of Rought’s 
post-invocation statements.  The Government, for instance, 
told the jury in its opening statement that they would “actually 
hear the defendant admitting to . . . drug dealing.”  App. 190.  
Among other uses, the video of the interrogation was played 
during Agent Whitehead’s testimony, and the Government’s 
closing arguments referred back to Rought’s statements.  The 
jury convicted Rought on all counts, and he was sentenced to 




The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We review the denial of a motion to suppress for clear 
error as to the facts that the District Court found and exercise 
plenary review over the application of law to those facts.  




Rought argues that the District Court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress for three reasons.  First, Rought argues 
that his invocation of the right to counsel was not limited to the 
circumstances of Carichner’s death but was instead without 
limitation and that law enforcement was therefore required to 
cease interrogation entirely under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 
U.S. 477 (1981).  Second, Rought argues that after he invoked 
his right to counsel, he did not initiate the post-invocation 
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discussion about Carichner.  Third, Rought argues that any 
post-invocation waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing 
and intelligent because he was not “fully aware” of the 
potential consequences, including the risk — which came to 
pass — that he was opening himself up to conspiracy charges.  
Rought Br. 26.  We will below elucidate the relevant legal 





The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person . . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  To safeguard this right, the 
Supreme Court in Miranda “imposed certain obligations on 
police in custodial interrogations, in order to dissipate the 
‘compelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he 
would not otherwise do so freely.’”  United States v. 
Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1084 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).  The familiar Miranda warnings 
require police to “inform the suspect of his right to remain 
silent and his right to have counsel present during 
interrogation, as well as their intent to use his statements to 
secure a conviction.”  Id.  Police must also “cease the 
interrogation if at any point the suspect indicates that he wishes 
to remain silent or that he wants an attorney.”  Id. 
 
In Edwards, the Supreme Court established a bright-line 
rule for suspects who have invoked the right to counsel:  “an 
accused person in custody who has invoked his desire not to 
speak until he has conferred with counsel ‘is not subject to 
further interrogation . . . until counsel has been made available 
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to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.’”  
Id. (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85).  If a suspect who 
has invoked the right to counsel but not yet met with counsel 
initiates discussion with the authorities, further interrogation2 
can take place.  Id. at 1084, 1087.  Post-invocation statements 
made during that interrogation may then be admissible against 
the suspect at trial if the suspect knowingly and voluntarily 
waives the right to counsel and the right to remain silent.  Id.; 
see also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) 
(plurality opinion); Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9. 
 
In Bradshaw, the Court split 4-4 on what it means for a 
suspect to “initiate” discussion following an invocation of the 
right to counsel.  The plurality held that the suspect in the case 
before it initiated discussion where his question — “Well, what 
is going to happen to me now?” — “evinced a willingness and 
a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.”  
462 U.S. at 1045-46.  The dissenters would have held that 
initiation requires “communication or dialogue about the 
subject matter of the criminal investigation.”  Id. at 1053 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).  In Velasquez, 
this Court adopted the Bradshaw plurality’s test for initiation, 
holding “that an initiation occurs when a suspect initiates a 
conversation evincing a willingness and a desire for a 
 
2 Under Miranda, “the term ‘interrogation’ . . . refers not 
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions 
on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant 
to arrest and custody) that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect.”  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) 
(footnote omitted). 
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generalized discussion about the investigation.”  885 F.2d at 
1085 (cleaned up).  Initiation and waiver are distinct analytical 
steps; initiation by itself is not adequate to find a waiver.  Id. at 
1087. 
 
A waiver of the Miranda rights must be voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent considering the totality of the 
circumstances.  Id. at 1086 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).  
A waiver is voluntary if “it was the product of a free and 
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or 
deception.”  Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987) 
(quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)).  In the 
voluntariness inquiry, “[a] suspect’s background and 
experience, including prior dealings with the criminal justice 
system, should be taken into account.”  United States v. Jacobs, 
431 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 2005).  A waiver is knowing and 
intelligent if “made with a full awareness both of the nature of 
the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision 
to abandon it.”  Spring, 479 U.S. at 573 (quoting Burbine, 475 
U.S. at 421); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 
382-83 (2010).  If the Government “shows that a Miranda 
warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, 
an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied 
waiver of the right to remain silent.”  Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 
384.  
 
In sum, then, a suspect who has invoked the right to 
counsel and has not yet met with counsel is generally not 
subject to further interrogation unless the suspect initiates 
discussion with law enforcement.  Once there has been an 
initiation, further interrogation can take place, and the 
suspect’s statements may be admissible against him at trial if 
he validly waives the right to remain silent and the right to 
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counsel.  See Velasquez, 885 F.2d at 1084-89.  
  
Or at least, these are the principles that generally apply 
after a suspect invokes the right to counsel “for all purposes.”  
Barrett, 479 U.S. at 530.  A key premise of the decisions 
discussed above is that a suspect’s invocation of the right to 
counsel reflects a “desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel.”  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.  The Supreme Court 
recognized in Barrett, however, that not all invocations reflect 
such a desire.  The defendant in Barrett refused “to put 
anything in writing until his attorney came,” but was willing to 
offer an oral confession despite knowing that police planned to 
record it on tape.  479 U.S. at 525-26.  The Court held that 
Barrett’s oral statements were admissible, reasoning that 
nothing “requires authorities to ignore the tenor or sense of a 
defendant’s response to [Miranda] warnings.”  Id. at 528.  If 
police had obtained a written statement without complying 
with Edwards, it would “clearly” have been inadmissible, but 
it was “quite consistent with the Fifth Amendment” for law 
enforcement to make use of “the opportunity provided by 
Barrett to obtain an oral confession.”  Id. at 529.   
 
The invocation in Barrett was limited by the mode of 
the suspect’s communications:  written statements were within 
the invocation while oral statements were not.  But the Court’s 
reasoning in Barrett is not limited to mode.  It applies with 
equal force to invocations limited by topic or subject matter, 
and we now hold that suspects can limit their invocations of 
the right to counsel in this manner.3  Numerous federal and 
 
3 We caution, however, that the Barrett decision creates 
only a narrow exception to the Edwards rule, and that it is 
appropriate to give ambiguous invocations of the right to 
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state courts have likewise relied on the Barrett decision to find 
that an invocation was limited by topic or subject matter.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Oba, 978 F.2d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(concluding that invocation was limited to advice of counsel 
concerning effect of x-ray consent form on potential civil 
action); United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147, 152-53 (5th Cir. 
1991) (determining that invocation was limited to questions 
about where defendant obtained materials to make a bomb); 
United States v. Conner, 946 F.2d 896, 1991 WL 213756, at 
*1-2 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming finding that invocation was 
limited to “narcotics activity” and did not cover other 
investigative topics); United States v. Mikelic, No. 3:10-cr-
132, 2011 WL 4368565, at *11 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2011) 
(“Mikelic only stated that he wanted to speak with his lawyer 
with respect to certain questions . . . . Thus, it did not violate 
the Fifth Amendment for [law enforcement] to continue 
questioning Mikelic following Mikelic’s limited invocation of 
his right to counsel.”); People v. Adams, 627 N.W.2d 623, 628 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (“Because defendant only declined to 
answer some questions regarding a few limited topics and only 
asserted a need for counsel with respect to questions regarding 
motive . . . the police detective was permitted to continue 
interviewing defendant regarding other matters pertaining to 
the . . . murder.”); State v. Brennan, 850 P.2d 202, 206 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a 
suppression motion when the defendant refused to discuss “the 
events of the night of June 19” with the police but agreed to 
discuss “related background events”); see generally 2 Wayne 
R. LaFave et al., Crim. Proc. § 6.9(g) (4th ed., Dec. 2020 
update) (“It is possible that the defendant’s invocation of his 
 
counsel “a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation.”  Barrett, 
479 U.S. at 529. 
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right to counsel will be limited in some way, in which case 
application of the Edwards rule is limited to the same extent, 
as the Supreme Court concluded in Connecticut v. Barrett.”).  
Rought’s brief acknowledges that invocations can be limited in 
scope, as Rought’s counsel conceded at oral argument.4 
 
There is scant authority, however, addressing the 
interaction between the Barrett and Bradshaw decisions — that 
 
4  The dissent contends that Barrett does not justify 
“holding that police may continue questioning a suspect after 
he has invoked his right to counsel on a topic that is germane 
to their investigation.”  Dissenting Op. 9.  This contention is 
refuted by the Barrett decision itself:  after the suspect there 
invoked his right to counsel as to written statements, law 
enforcement continued to question him about the very same 
investigation and secured an oral confession, which the Court 
held admissible.  479 U.S. at 525, 529. 
 The dissent counters that “Barrett’s invocation as to 
written statements is not analogous to a topic-specific 
invocation” because “Barrett’s invocation did not suggest that 
he felt unable to handle the pressures of interrogation on any 
topic.”  Dissenting Op. 9–10. This account of Barrett is 
implausible.  The Court’s opinion offers no basis for 
distinguishing between limited invocations that suggest an 
inability to “handle the pressures of interrogation on any topic” 
and those that do not.  To the contrary, the Court distinguished 
between invocations that are “limited” and those that are 
“effective for all purposes,” with the scope of the former to be 
discerned by the “tenor or sense of a defendant’s response” to 
the Miranda warnings, and not some gestalt impression of a 
suspect’s fortitude under questioning, as the dissent would 
have it.  479 U.S. at 528-30. 
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is, between limited invocations and post-invocation initiations.  
It is clear that if law enforcement unilaterally seeks to obtain 
statements from a suspect about matters within the scope of a 
limited invocation, those statements would be inadmissible.  
See Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529.  But when can law enforcement 
resume interrogation on a topic covered by a limited 
invocation?  And what qualifies as an “initiation” on a covered 
topic following a limited invocation? 
 
As an initial matter, it cannot be the case, as Rought 
asserts, that a complete cessation of all interrogation is required 
before law enforcement can resume interrogation on a covered 
topic.  That would be inconsistent with the Barrett decision, 
which counsels that interrogation can continue as to matters 
outside the scope of a limited invocation.  Instead, it is 
sufficient if law enforcement respects the suspect’s wishes and 
ceases interrogation concerning any topic covered by a limited 
invocation.  This means no more questions not only about the 
covered topic, but also about any topics “that the police should 
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 
from the suspect” about the covered topic.  Innis, 446 U.S. at 
301 (footnote omitted). 
 
Assuming that law enforcement has ceased 
interrogation about the covered topic, we agree with the 
Government that as a practical matter, a suspect’s post-
invocation “initiation” must mean something like bringing “the 
subject back up.”  Gov’t Br. 26; see also Oba, 978 F.2d at 1130 
(concluding there was no Edwards violation where suspect 
“initiated further discussion” concerning the topic covered by 
his limited invocation).  Following Bradshaw and Velasquez, 
we hold that after a limited invocation, “an initiation occurs 
when a suspect initiates a [line of discussion that] evinc[es] a 
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willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the 
[covered topic].”  Velasquez, 885 F.2d at 1085.  And we agree 
with the District Court that it is important for the suspect to 
bring the covered topic back up without undue prompting from 
law enforcement.  See App. 97 (“[L]aw enforcement did not 
prompt Rought’s return to the subject of Mr. Carichner”).  As 
noted above, then, there is no “initiation” on a covered topic if 
the suspect is responding to “words or actions on the part of the 
police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect” concerning 
the covered topic.  Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (footnoted omitted); 
cf. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484 (“[A] valid waiver of th[e] right 
[to counsel] cannot be established by showing only that [a 
suspect] responded to further police-initiated custodial 
interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.”).5  That 
is, there is no “initiation” by the suspect if the suspect is 
responding to interrogation that law enforcement should know 
is reasonably likely to elicit a response on the covered topic.6  
 
In sum, if a suspect makes a limited invocation of the 
 
5  There may be other circumstances in which law 
enforcement unduly prompts a suspect to initiate a post-
invocation discussion of a topic covered by a limited 
invocation short of interrogation, but they are not before us, 
and we need not consider them.  Likewise, we need not 
consider whether law enforcement must re-inform a suspect of 
his Miranda rights before resuming interrogation on a covered 
topic following an initiation — though doing so would likely 
minimize doubt that a suspect’s waiver is voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent. 
6 The dissent’s suggestion that today’s decision creates 
a “gotcha game” because interrogators “can try to induce [a 
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right to counsel, the Edwards rule is limited to the same extent.  
See 2 LaFave, supra, Crim. Proc. § 6.9(g).  Law enforcement 
must honor the suspect’s request and cease interrogation 
concerning any topics covered by the invocation.  If the suspect 
then initiates discussion of covered topics without prompting 
from law enforcement, interrogation can resume as to those 
topics.  If the suspect validly waives the right to silence and the 
previously invoked right to counsel, then the suspect’s 









 Rought first argues that his invocation of the right to 
counsel was not limited to the circumstances of Carichner’s 
death but was “for all purposes,” and that law enforcement was 
therefore required to cease interrogation entirely under 
Edwards.  We disagree. 
 
 Whitehead properly informed Rought of his Miranda 
rights at the outset of the interrogation.  Rought said he was 
willing to talk “to a point.”  Rought proceeded to discuss a 
variety of topics, including his addiction, his fentanyl source, 
 
suspect] to talk about the very topic that he has said he does 
not want to discuss,” see Dissenting Op. 1, is thus misplaced.  
If interrogators do so, the suspect will not have re-initiated and 
the Edwards rule will still be in effect as to any topics covered 
by the invocation. 
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his relationship with Carichner, and his criminal history.  It was 
only when Whitehead said, “So let’s talk about Dana.  What 
happened there?” that Rought responded, “I don’t really want 
to talk about that aspect without my lawyer. . . . That’s a serious 
situation.  I mean, they’re trying to roof me.”   
 
 In context, it is plain that “that aspect” refers to the 
circumstances of Carichner’s death.  Rought had previous 
experience with the criminal justice system, understood his 
Miranda rights, and openly spoke about other facets of his own 
criminal conduct.  He had just been indicted for possession 
with intent to distribute resulting in serious bodily injury and 
death — a charge likely to result in a long prison sentence.  
Given this context and the course of the interrogation up to the 
point of Rought’s invocation, “that aspect” is most naturally 
understood to refer to Carichner’s death — a “serious 
situation” that could result in Rought getting “roofed,” and 
distinct from the subjects Rought had been discussing up to 
that point.   
 
Rought argues that his invocation was not so limited, 
and that “‘that aspect’ could mean only one thing:  any matter 
relating to the circumstances of Carichner’s death, including 
Rought’s involvement in drug dealing in general.”  Rought Br. 
22.  Alternatively, he argues that his invocation was ambiguous 
and should be construed broadly.  Again, we disagree, and the 
District Court’s determinations to the contrary were not clearly 
erroneous.  It is not plausible that by refusing to discuss “that 
aspect” of the case without a lawyer, Rought was actually 
expressing “his desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel.”  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added).  To 
accept Rought’s argument would require “a disregard of the 
ordinary meaning of [his] statement.”  Barrett, 479 U.S. at 530.  
20 
In context, the limited nature of Rought’s invocation is not 
ambiguous.  Cf. In re Friedman’s Inc., 738 F.3d 547, 554 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (noting that ambiguity must be evaluated in light of 
overall context). 
 
Rought further argues that it would “belie[] common 
sense” to find that he “was sufficiently astute and calm” to 
make only a limited invocation, and that it is “perverse” to 
penalize a suspect who “happens to be too garrulous for his 
own good” because his lawyer has not yet arrived.  Rought Br. 
22-23.  These arguments are beside the point.  The Supreme 
Court has made clear that Miranda protects a suspect’s choice 
to speak or not, and that if the warnings are understood, it is of 
no moment “that some might find [Rought’s] decision 
illogical.”  Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529-30. 
 
We therefore conclude that there was no clear error in 
the District Court’s determination that Rought’s “invocation of 
the right to counsel was limited and not broad in nature,” and 




 Rought next argues that he did not initiate the post-
invocation discussion of Carichner’s death.  He asserts initially 
that there cannot be a post-invocation initiation if “the 
interrogation never ceases.”  Rought Br. 23.  We reject this 
argument for reasons already given — the teaching of Barrett 
is that interrogation need not cease entirely following a limited 
invocation, but can continue as to matters not covered by the 
invocation. 
 
 After Rought’s invocation, Whitehead responded that 
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he respected Rought’s right, and refocused the interrogation on 
Rought’s drug supplier, L.B.  In an effort to persuade Rought 
to cooperate in pursuing L.B., Whitehead emphasized the harm 
that drug addiction and drug dealers visit on the community, 
and mentioned the overdose of Rought’s friend Stan Derby, 
another addict who bought from L.B.  Whitehead asked for 
information that would help in “going up the ladder” after L.B. 
and others like him.  Whitehead’s comments prompted Rought 
to state that drug dealers are “killing my friends just as much 
as, right now, you’re trying to say that I killed” Carichner.  We 
hold that when Rought made this statement, he initiated 
discussion on Carichner’s death and thereby opened himself up 
to further interrogation on that subject.  His voluntary return to 
the subject of his then-alleged role in Carichner’s death 
evinced a willingness for a generalized discussion about the 
issue.  See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46 (plurality opinion) 
(concluding that respondent initiated post-invocation by 
asking, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?”); 
Velasquez, 885 F.2d at 1085 (holding that defendant initiated 
post-invocation by asking, “What is going to happen?”). 
 
 Rought argues that Whitehead’s comments following 
Rought’s invocation about Derby’s overdose and going after 
L.B. were intended “to elicit Rought’s verbal response” about 
Carichner, in order “to create a record that might support a 
finding of post-invocation initiating.”  Rought Br. 24.  As a 
general matter, we acknowledge that it is not totally 
unforeseeable that an appeal to Rought’s conscience and a 
reference to Derby’s overdose could lead Rought to discuss 
Carichner’s overdose.  
 
But on this record, we agree with the District Court that 
“[t]he question[s] about L.B. and Mr. Derby [concerned] 
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subjects distinct from . . . the circumstances surrounding Mr. 
Carichner and [were] not ones that law enforcement should 
have reasonably anticipated would prompt Rought to renew 
discussions about Mr. Carichner.”  App. 97.  Much of the 
interrogation up to that point was focused on gathering 
information about L.B. and discussing the deleterious effects 
of drug addiction and drug dealing.  Rought had been willing 
to discuss those issues, but then carved out Carichner’s death 
as a forbidden topic.  An agent in Whitehead’s position could 
reasonably have expected that Rought would continue to 
differentiate among the distinct issues in the interrogation, 
notwithstanding some overlap in subject matter.7  Likewise, an 
agent in Whitehead’s position could reasonably have expected 
that his request for Rought’s help in going after L.B. would not 
prompt Rought to bring Carichner back up shortly after Rought 
indicated that he did not want to discuss Carichner.  We do not 
think it justifiable, given this context, to charge Whitehead 
with the knowledge that his comments may have elicited a 
response from Rought about Carichner’s death.  See Innis, 446 
U.S. at 301 (holding that interrogation includes “words or 
actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know 
 
7  The dissent’s argument that Carichner’s death, 
Derby’s death, and the effects of drugs on the community were 
all part of one big topic of conversation is belied by the record.  
Rought and his interrogators differentiated between these 
subjects, the District Court accordingly found that they were 
“distinct,” and that finding was not clearly erroneous.  App. 97. 
23 




 Lastly, Rought argues that any post-invocation waiver 
was not effective because he was not “fully aware of the 
consequences if he were to waive his right to counsel to any 
extent.”  Rought Br. 26.  Rought argues in particular that he 
“could not have been fully aware of the consequences 
concerning involvement in a conspiracy, and how broadly such 
charges would sweep.”  Id.  But he otherwise concedes that, 
given “the totality of the circumstances, it might be reasonable 
to infer that [he] was fully aware of the consequences of 
waiving [the] right to counsel concerning legal issues arising 
out of any involvement” in Carichner and Giberson’s 
overdoses.  Id. 
 
Rought’s argument that his waiver was invalid because 
he did not foresee all of its potential consequences is meritless.  
It is beyond cavil that “[t]he Constitution does not require that 
 
8 Rought also takes issue with Whitehead’s comments 
that Rought “had a role” in Carichner’s death and that Rought 
must “feel like shit” about it.  By the time Whitehead made 
these comments, however, Rought had already initiated 
discussion about Carichner’s death, and was thus subject to 
interrogation about that topic.  Velasquez, 885 F.2d at 1087.  
Accordingly, we do not reach the question whether these 
comments by Whitehead amounted to interrogation under 
Innis, as the answer does not affect our disposition of Rought’s 
appeal.  The dissent’s suggestion that these statements have 
any bearing on whether Rought re-initiated discussion about 
Carichner’s death is mistaken for the same reason.  
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a criminal suspect know and understand every possible 
consequence of a waiver.”  Spring, 479 U.S. at 574.  A waiver 
is generally held to be knowing and voluntary “if the defendant 
fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely 
apply in general in the circumstances—even though the 
defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of 
invoking it.”  United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).  
We long ago observed that “[i]t is not in the sense of 
shrewdness that Miranda speaks of ‘intelligent’ waiver but 
rather in the tenor that the individual must know of his 
available options before deciding what he thinks best suits his 
particular situation.”  Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 739 (3d 
Cir. 1974) (en banc).  A similar principle applies to the 
voluntariness inquiry.  See Barrett, 479 U.S. at 530 (“The fact 
that some might find Barrett’s decision illogical is irrelevant, 
for we have never ‘embraced the theory that a defendant’s 
ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates 
their voluntariness.’” (footnoted omitted) (quoting Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985))). 
 
Rought makes only the above argument concerning 
waiver; he has thus forfeited all others.  See Barna v. Bd. of 
Sch. Dirs., 877 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017).  Even if Rought 
had preserved additional arguments and not conceded the 
point, we would readily conclude that his post-invocation 
waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under the 
totality of the circumstances.  Rought was read his Miranda 
rights, signed a form acknowledging that he understood them, 
and consented to questioning.  He had prior experience with 
the criminal justice system and was surely aware that his 
statements to law enforcement could be used against him.  
There is also no basis in the record for finding involuntariness.  
Neither Whitehead’s comment about Rought’s role in 
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Carichner’s death nor anything else he or Yelland said or did 
approaches the kind of law enforcement overreach necessary 
to render a statement involuntary.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 
479 U.S. 157, 163-65 (1986); Velasquez, 885 F.2d at 1087-89; 
Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 603-13 (3d Cir. 1986);  2 
LaFave, supra, Crim. Proc. § 6.2(c) nn.120-61 and 
accompanying text.  By choosing to speak in detail about the 
circumstances of Carichner’s death after initiating discussion 
on that topic, Rought knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to remain silent and his limited invocation of 
the right to counsel.  See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384; Velasquez, 
885 F.2d at 1087-89. 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
 Rought made a limited invocation of his right to 
counsel, cutting off questioning only about the death of Dana 
Carichner.  Shortly after that invocation, he initiated 
conversation with law enforcement about Carichner’s death, 
and waived his previously invoked right not to discuss 
Carichner without counsel’s assistance.  Rought’s post-
invocation statements were thus admissible against him at trial, 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 












ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.  
 The right to counsel during an in-custody interrogation 
should not be the target of a “gotcha game.”1  The interrogator 
shouldn’t consider a suspect’s invocation of the right to 
counsel as an opportunity to trick the suspect into bringing up, 
on his own, the protected subject matter.  If the suspect does 
so, “gotcha!”  He has waived the right to counsel. 
  
The Majority has created the perfect playing field for a 
gotcha game.  In permitting a “limited,” topic-specific 
invocation of the right to counsel, the Majority leaves the 
suspect in a morass of what topics are protected by the request 
for counsel and what topics the interrogators can continue to 
pursue.  The interrogators not only can continue questioning 
him about other topics, but they also can try to induce him to 
talk about the very topic that he has said he does not want to 
discuss.  If the suspect is induced to say something about the 
protected topic, he has waived the right to counsel.  Gotcha!  




1 “Gotcha” is defined as “to exultingly point out a blunder, etc”.  







Miranda2 is based on the Court’s determination that “in-
custody interrogation . . . contains inherently compelling 
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to 
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not 
otherwise do so freely.”3  “Even without employing brutality, 
the ‘third degree’ or . . . specific stratagems . . . the very fact of 
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty 
and trades on the weakness of individuals.”4  Thus, “custodial 
interrogation [must] be preceded by advice to the putative 
defendant that he has the right to remain silent and also the 
right to the presence of an attorney.”5  If the suspect invokes 
his right to counsel, it creates a presumption “that he considers 
himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial 
interrogation without legal assistance.”6  Police “must cease 
the interrogation if at any point the suspect indicates that he 
wishes to remain silent or that he wants an attorney.”7   
 
A. 
 The Majority seems oblivious to the coercive character 
of custodial interrogation that motivated the Supreme Court in 
Miranda8 to protect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination.  This inherently coercive pressure of custodial 
 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3 Id.at 467 
4 Id. at 455. 
5 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481–82 (1981). 
6 Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988). 
7 United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1084 (3d Cir. 
1989) (citation omitted). 







interrogation may affect the suspect in several significant 
ways.   
 
 Of prime importance is the fact that a suspect’s decision 
to talk about some topics, but not others, may be compromised 
by the ongoing interrogation.  When a suspect invokes his right 
to counsel, he has indicated “that he considers himself unable 
to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without 
legal assistance.”9  If a suspect explicitly states that 
interrogation on some topics is too much for him, can we 
assume that he can handle interrogation on similar topics?  In 
particular, if the suspect has come to this conclusion while the 
coercive interrogation is still ongoing, how reliable is his 
decision?  As Rought argues, it “belies common sense” to 
conclude that a suspect “[i]s sufficiently astute and calm” 
during an FBI interrogation “to carve out a subset of . . . 
discussion topics”10 that he is able to handle.11    
 
 Moreover, even if a suspect can “carve out a subset of 
discussion topics,” the Majority ignores the difficult legal 
landscape that the suspect now must navigate to avoid being 
caught in a “gotcha game”: 
 
9 Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683.   
10 Opening Br. 23. 
11 Indeed, even the suspect’s statements on other topics not 
covered by the invocation are likely tainted by the coercive 
nature of the custodial interrogation.:  “[T]he presumption . . . 
that [the suspect] considers himself unable to deal with the 
pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance . . 
. does not disappear simply because the police have 
approached the suspect, still in custody, still without counsel, 







 While in this coercive setting, the suspect must make 
sure that his invocation of the right to counsel is 
“unequivocal,” not just unequivocal from his own 
perspective or even from a reasonable layperson’s 
perspective, but from the perspective of a reasonable 
police officer.12  A request for an attorney, which is 
ambiguous or equivocal, as understood by a reasonable 
interrogator, does not invoke the right to counsel.13   
 Moreover, under the Majority’s holding, the suspect 
must now make sure that an unequivocal invocation is 
not construed (also from the perspective of an 
interrogator14) as being “limited” in some way.  If the 
suspect intended the invocation to be unlimited and the 
interrogators misconstrue it as limited and continue to 
ask him questions, what is the suspect to make of their 
earlier promise to cease interrogation if he invoked his 
rights?  Does he clarify that his invocation was not 
limited by invoking his rights again or does he simply 
conclude that the interrogators have no intention of 
 
12 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); accord 
Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 710, 725 (3d Cir. 1995). 
13 Id.  
14 Compare Burrell v. Commonwealth, 710 S.E.2d 509, 516 
(Va. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he qualification must be one that a 
reasonable police officer would understand as placing a 
specific question outside the boundaries of the 
interrogation[.]”), with People v. Firestine, 132 N.E.3d 886, 
894–95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (“We find that the better approach 
is to hold that, if a qualification or limit is ambiguous, the 







respecting his rights and that re-invoking them would 
be “futile”?15   
 If the suspect did intend his invocation to be limited, he 
must determine what scope a reasonable interrogator 
will give to the limitation.16  If the police ask about 
topics that the suspect believed were covered by his 
invocation, will he realize that the police merely 
misconstrued his invocation—rather than ignored it—
and clarify the invocation for them?  If the suspect is 
frightened or timid or has poor command of English, 
will he be able to do so?  Perhaps he will just conclude 
that clarification would be futile. 
 Even if the interrogators properly construe his 
limitation, the suspect must make sure that he does not 
inadvertently say something that will later be construed 
by a court as his reinitiating on his own the discussion 
of topics that he has said he is unable to handle without 
counsel.   
 Finally, the suspect must do all this while continuing to 
respond to interrogation on other topics.   
 
  The number of landmines a suspect must avoid is mind-
boggling.  I cannot accept a rule that treats a suspect like a law 
 
15 Davis, 512 U.S. at 472–73 (Souter, J., concurring). 
16 This situation is a prime example of how exceedingly 
difficult it is to draw a line between what is and what is not 
“covered” by a topic-specific invocation.  Looking at the case 
before us, did Rought’s invocation of counsel mean that he did 
not want to talk about Carichner’s death without counsel 
present or that he did not want to talk about his drug dealings 
with Carichner, or both.  The government claims the former, 







school student who is taking an exam on criminal procedure.  
For suspects, the interrogation is not a hypothetical fact 
pattern; it is something they must navigate in real time while 
under extreme pressure—held alone and against their will, 
beset by police interrogators, and fearful of conviction and 
imprisonment.  In the real world, the Majority’s labyrinthine 
approach opens the door for the police to play “gotcha” by 
enabling them to (1) grind down a suspect’s will and “badger[] 
[him] into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,”17 
or (2) subtly subvert the limits imposed by his topic-specific 
invocation.   
 
The Majority’s approach will favor savvy suspects who 
understand the rules of the game but it will leave unsavvy 
suspects to fend for themselves.  That is precisely the result 
that Miranda forbids:  Under Miranda, the interrogators must 
state the rules, clearly and unequivocally, at the beginning of 




 At one time, the Supreme Court jealously guarded 
Miranda’s prophylactic rule.  In Edwards,18 the Court held that 
once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, he cannot later 
waive that invocation without counsel present19 unless the 
suspect, not the police, “initiate[s] further discussions” about 
 
17 Id. at 485 (O’Connor, J.) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
18 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 







the investigation.20  Otherwise, police could “badger[] the 
defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda 
rights.”21  The Court has also held that “[t]he Edwards rule . . . 
is not offense specific:  Once a suspect invokes the Miranda 
right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may 
not be reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is 
present.”22  “[T]he presumption raised by a suspect’s request 
for counsel—that he considers himself unable to deal with the 
pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance—
does not disappear simply because the police have approached 
the suspect, still in custody, still without counsel, about a 
separate investigation.”23 
 
 Over time, however, the Court has taken some steps to 
pare Miranda back.  For example, in Davis v. United States, 
the Court held that Edwards does not apply where “the 
suspect’s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal 
request for counsel.”24  That holding drew forceful 
disagreement from four Justices, who stated that it lacked 
“coherence with nearly three decades of case law addressing 
the relationship between police and criminal suspects in 
custodial interrogation.”25  Obviously, we are bound by Davis.  
But unlike the Majority, I would not erode Miranda further.  
Our precedents do not support the Majority’s narrow 
 
20 Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (citation omitted). 
21 Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
22 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991) (citing 
Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682). 
23 Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683.  
24 Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–62. 







construction of topic-specific invocations of the right to 
counsel.  Rather, Edwards and its progeny convince me that, 
once a suspect invokes the right to counsel as to one aspect of 
the police’s investigation, the police may not continue to 
question him, while still in custody and still without counsel, 
about any aspect of their investigation. 
 
B. 
 The Supreme Court has never held that topic-specific 
invocations of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel are 
“limited” to the identified topics.26  Before today, neither had 
we.  Only one other circuit has done so in a published in 
opinion,27 relying (like the Majority) on Connecticut v. 
Barrett.28  A handful of district and state courts have done the 
same.   
 
 None of these courts has explained, however, why 
Barrett supports holding that police may continue questioning 
a suspect after he has invoked his right to counsel on a topic 
that is germane to their investigation.  Simply put, it does not.  
Barrett did not involve a topic-specific invocation.  Rather, 
Barrett told police “that he would not give a written statement 
unless his attorney was present but had ‘no problem’ talking 
about the incident.”29  The Supreme Court held that Barrett’s 
subsequent oral statements were admissible.30     
 
26 But see Roberson, 486 U.S. at 684 (alluding to the possibility 
of topic-specific invocations in a counterfactual).  
27 United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147, 152–53 (5th Cir. 1991). 
28 479 U.S. 523 (1987). 
29 Barrett, 479 U.S. at 525.  







 Even if Barrett had not affirmatively stated his 
willingness to undergo unlimited oral interrogation,31 however, 
Barrett’s invocation as to written statements is not analogous 
to a topic-specific invocation.  Notwithstanding the Barrett 
Court’s dictum that Barrett’s invocation would have been 
effective to exclude written statements, Miranda provided for 
the right to the presence of counsel for a specific purpose—i.e., 
custodial interrogation.32  Barrett’s invocation did not suggest 
that he felt unable to handle the pressures of interrogation on 
any topic.  The act of writing down a statement does not 
involve interrogation to any extent that providing an oral 
statement does not already involve.  It thus is not surprising 
that asking for counsel as to only written statements is not 
sufficient to force police to stop oral questioning altogether.33  
 
31 See United States v. Martin, 664 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 
2011) (holding that lack of explicit consent to further 
questioning was not dispositive). 
32 See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991) 
(explaining that Edwards applies only where the suspect asks 
“for the particular sort of lawyerly assistance that is the subject 
of Miranda”—“the assistance of an attorney in dealing with 
custodial interrogation by the police”).   
33 Some courts have similarly held that a suspect’s refusal to 
sign a form or take a polygraph without counsel is a “limited” 
invocation.  See, e.g., United States v. Oba, 978 F.2d 1123, 
1130 (9th Cir. 1992); Stumes v. Solem, 752 F.2d 317, 320–21 
(8th Cir. 1985).  Like Barrett’s refusal to make a written 
statement, however, those refusals do not express an inability 
to handle the specific type of pressures identified in Miranda.  
To be clear, I do not suggest that these invocations (or Barrett’s 
invocation) are completely unenforceable under Miranda.  







By contrast, a topic-specific invocation relates directly to the 
suspect’s ability to deal with the pressures of custodial 
interrogation without legal assistance. 
 
 Here, Rought indicated that he was unable to deal with 
those pressures as to at least some topics.  If a suspect 
unequivocally states that he cannot handle an interrogation 
topic without counsel, all interrogation should stop 
immediately.  We should not “adopt a regime in which 
Edwards’ protection . . . could pass in and out of existence”34 
depending on the topic being discussed.  “Vagaries of this sort 
spread confusion through the justice system and lead to a 
consequent loss of respect for the underlying constitutional 
principle.”35 
 
 Because Rought invoked his right to counsel as to at 
least one topic of interrogation, Agent Whitehead should have 
stopped all interrogation, including questions regarding drug 
activity in Wilkes-Barre.  Yet, Agent Whitehead immediately 
continued questioning Rought.   
 
I would reverse the District Court’s Order denying 
Rought’s Motion to Suppress and hold that all of Rought’s 
statements after his invocation are inadmissible. 
 
require police to stop all questioning because, unlike Rought’s 
invocation, they do not suggest that the suspect was unable to 
deal with custodial interrogation specifically. 
34 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 154 (1990). 









 Even assuming, however, that police can continue 
questioning about other topics not mentioned in a request for 
counsel, I tentatively agree that the District Court did not 
clearly err in holding that Rought’s invocation was limited to 
“the subject of Mr. Carichner,”36 but only insofar as “the 
subject of Mr. Carichner” includes anything about Carichner 
and any drug sharing between Rought and Carichner.  To the 
extent that the District Court construed Rought’s invocation as 
limited only to Carichner’s death, it clearly erred.  Agent 
Whitehead asked, “Let’s talk about Dana?  What happened 
there?”  Rought responded, “I don’t really want to talk about 
that aspect without my lawyer because, like, that’s a serious 
situation.  I mean, they’re trying to roof me . . . .”  No 
reasonable construction of that statement would allow the 
District Court to find that it was limited to Carichner’s death.  
Whitehead said, “Let’s talk about Dana,” not “Let’s talk about 
Dana’s death”; he asked, “What happened there,” not “What 
happened to Carichner.”  These statements are not susceptible 
 
36 Appx. 97.  I note, however, that even this broader 
construction survives only because of our generous standard of 
review.  The more reasonable construction of Rought’s 
invocation is that it covered everything for which the 
government is “trying to roof” him (i.e., send him to prison).  
Thus, if we were reviewing the invocation de novo, I would 
hold that a reasonable police officer would construe it as 
covering every topic that could reasonably have led to 








to such a narrow reading. 
 
 The Majority holds that “that aspect” was limited to “the 
circumstances of Carichner’s death” in part because Rought 
had already “openly spoke[n] about other facets of his own 
criminal conduct.”  But a suspect can invoke his rights even as 
to topics about which he has previously spoken.  Moreover, the 
charges on which the government was trying to “roof” Rought 
(send him to prison) required proof of drug distribution, not 
merely that Rought caused Carichner’s death.  
 
B. 
 The Majority holds that Rought reinitiated discussion 
about Carichner when he said, “you’re trying to say that I killed 
my friend.”  Not so.  Before Rought said anything, Whitehead 
continued the interrogation by asking about Derby and drug 
dealing’s effects on the “community.”   
 
 The District Court believed that “[t]he questioning 
about L.B. and Mr. Derby, a person to whom L.B. sold drugs, 
were subjects distinct from that of the circumstances 
surrounding Mr. Carichner.”37  Again, I disagree.  Rought 
allegedly provided Carichner with drugs obtained from L.B., 
causing his death.  Derby similarly died because of L.B.’s 
drugs.  Inevitably, focusing on Derby’s death and the effects 
on the “community” would lead back to Carichner’s similar 
death and its similar effects on the community.  Indeed, earlier 
in the interrogation, Whitehead said that “a tragedy resulted 
from your actions.  And not just yours . . . . This is what’s going 
on daily in the community.”  
 







 Nor did Whitehead try to turn the conversation back to 
L.B.  He said that he wanted to talk about L.B. because he was 
“trying to make sense of it,” i.e., make sense of the overdoses.  
Only then, when questioned about L.B. in that context, did 
Rought say, “you’re trying to say that I killed my friend.”   
 
 Rought’s statement did not change the subject of the 
conversation.  At most, Rought made a passing reference to the 
charges against him while talking about how other drug 
dealers were “killing [his] friends”—the same topic Whitehead 
had already brought up in his questions about Derby, the 
“community,” and “wanting to understand” the overdoses.  
This passing reference does not show a “desire for a 
generalized discussion” about topics Rought explicitly said he 
would not discuss without counsel—at least not any more than 
Whitehead’s questioning had already brought up those topics.  
Yet, Whitehead took this as an invitation:  “[W]e’re not saying 
you killed him, James, but what we’re saying is that, um, you 
had a role. . . . and I’m sure you feel like shit. . . . [N]one of us 
are going to say that you went there with intent and malice.”   
 
 Whitehead’s questions and statements were directed at 
Rought.  His question about Derby was made in connection 
with his statements about being “caught in a bad spot,” 
“help[ing] the community,” and a slew of others.  They were 
provocative:  “I’m sure you feel like shit.”  And at this point, 
Whitehead could clearly see that Rought was distraught over 
the loss of his friends.  Goading a defendant with comments 
about the loss of his friends and hurling accusations at him in 
an FBI interrogation room is custodial interrogation.38  
 
38 Cf. United States v. Lafferty, 503 F.3d 293, 302 (3d Cir. 







Accordingly, the interrogation was reinitiated by Whitehead, 
not Rought.   
 
III. 
 In conclusion, this case is a prime example of why 
topic-specific invocations should not be “limited.”   
Interrogations are too messy, and the pressures they exert too 
subtle and susceptible to police exploitation.  Because I 
disagree with the Majority’s new rule and its application of that 
rule to the facts of this case, I respectfully dissent.  I would 
suppress all of Rought’s statements after his invocation of the 
right to counsel.  In the alternative, if we were to allow limited 
invocation of the right to counsel, I would hold that Rought did 
not waive his request for counsel and similarly that Rought’s 




invocation of right to remain silent by placing defendant in 
interrogation room with codefendant while they interrogated 
the codefendant). 
